M. Avrum Ehrlich

Introduction

This article tries to understand two aspects of the relationship between Sabbateanism and secularism , the first is the influence of the Donme; an organised Sabbatean group which converted to Islam out of theological conviction which, it will be argued, underscored a distinct “assimilation doctrine” and maintained a profound sympathy for secularism. The second is the general influence of Sabbatean doctrines and the extent to which it trickled down and permeated strains within the mainstream Jewish mindset. These two are very different, despite its secrecy the aforementioned group is an organised cultural group while the latter is no such thing, it does not credit Sabbateanism in any way and even tries to disguise its Sabbatean influence. So proof must be sought through clues and doctrinal similarities still extant within the thinking patterns of suspected groups. Scholars such as Scholem and Katz undertook this and we have them to thank for drawing the connection between Sabbateanism and certain modern Jewish phenomena. This article takes on from Scholem’s assertion and Katz’s follow-up that Sabbateanism, as an anti-nomian religion , provided precedents and legitimacy to a Judaism that did not necessarily keep all Jewish law and in doing so paved the way to forms of ritually non-observant Judaism such as the Haskalla and Zionism. In this paper we will concentrate, amongst other things, on evidence of Sabbatean influence on the Young Turk revolution and on Zionism.

We know the importance of ideas, and by extension of religion, in galvanising people into networks and then into political action. Human-kind seems to be ever-developing the sophistication of its alliance networks and the way in which people, groups and nations consolidate and make covenants. The Sabbatean network structure is remarkable in many ways. Social networking in general serves as nothing less than a barometer, albeit not always easy to read, measuring degrees of social evolution. The process by which ideas move and grow and are disseminated beyond their original breeding ground is an area little researched. Sabbateanism is such a phenomena and is allusive, tracing its long-term permeation is difficult. By which media were the ideas of Sabbateanism transferred? How did Sabbateanism transform? Did those people influenced by Sabbatean ideas work solely within Jewish frameworks or at convenient opportunities break from them to more lucrative ground leaving no trace of having existed? Are Sabbateans always dreamy mystics (or perverts as portrayed in many historical accounts) or are they social activists, revolutionaries, liberals and people intuitively seeking moderation and a desire to shrug off the yoke of restrictive religious governance? Was the Sabbatean breakaway movement a deviation from the norm or an attempt to reform and a catalyst for what later became the Jewish Enlightenment? Are there still groups of people which show evidence or signs of Sabbatean influence? Whether this area of research can be understood in much the same way as the study of the empirical sciences and the study of, say - energy, which never dissipates but only changes form, depends on our ability to trace and document its transformations. How we trace a collection of religious ideas embodied in a particular group as they spread or are transformed, disseminate or become desirable to other civilisations is not yet a science. Some of these questions are addressed in the following study. Sabbateanism is an example in point, being strategically positioned to be the carrier of new ideas. It was, however, less able to survive as an intact group over the furies of history, leaving us primarily with an important doctrinal heritage sweeping through and affecting both Jewish and wider society. The story of the Donme only partly depicts the extent of Sabbatean influence.

Key Terms

It is appropriate to make a few general comments and establish working definitions of the major subjects discussed here.

Sabbateanism developed to explain the teachings and actions of Sabetay Sevi (Shabbtai Zvi), who declared his messiaship in 1666 and soon afterwards allegedly converted to Islam, leaving a large and far-flung flock in the Ottoman Empire and beyond very confused. He and his followers combined the study of Lurianic Kabbalah with overt messianism and a unique relationship with the Ottoman Empire. The aberration of Jewish law as taught by his disciples was justified with mystical rationale as an important step in the messianic redemption. Thus disobedience to Jewish religious law became acceptable and even encouraged in the sect while purporting o have a desire for holiness, and a belief in God and the Messiah. Abandoning tradition seemed to legitimise and even encourages assimilatory thinking as a religious tenet, something which had been strongly condemned by the rabbinic leadership till that time. Sabbateanism witnessed a group of Sevi’s adherents converting to Islam (known as the Donme) but other forms converted to Catholicism (Frankism) and it is considered likely that other arguably assimilatory efforts (such as Haskalla, Reform, Secular Zionism ) were either inspired by Sabbatean doctrine or underwent the same processes that led to its development. Assimilation seems to be a common thread amongst these groups. For many believers who rejected Sabetay Sevi’s messiahship after his apostasy, the issues he extolled nevertheless still remained relevant. They were ideas that had been repressed by the traditional leadership but had been given credibility by the Sabbatean movement, and even though it took on extreme expression by Sevi’s conversion to Islam, the ideas remained intact. Had Sevi and his followers not taken such extreme measures the ideas expressed would never have reached a critical mass, but clearly there existed pent-up feelings and dissatisfaction in Jewish life which needed to be vented and it fell on these events to bring them to the fore. Indeed, many Jews wished to remain loyal to their religious, traditional, family and emotional heritage but also had reservations about their lives under existing conditions. The all-permeating legal demands of ritual Jewish law (halakhah) were stifling, the introverted stance of the Jewish community and its fear of engaging the wider society did not suit the ambitious nature of many Jews. The lack of a living Hebrew culture and the absence of Jewish national symbols and the sense that Jews were not able to entirely share the pride and empathy of other Turks in the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire was frustrating. Many sought a way to integrate into the larger society and sought a national identity while not giving up their essential Jewish belief systems and the culture dear to them. Sabbateanism emerged to provide doctrinal solutions for these people. The doctrines emerging did not remain the heritage of a closed group. While the “assimilation doctrine” was not always conducive to group building, it was an important enough idea to proliferate and it did so leaving few traceable links to its Sabbatean source .

The Donme are the descendents of a small group of people who, emulating Sabetay Sevi, converted to Islam. Some will argue, amongst them members of modern day Donme communities in Turkey, that they had been forced to convert to Islam like their leader had and the theological conviction in support of the conversion developed only afterwards . The term “Donme” is Turkish for an insincere conversion to Islam – apostate . The Donme community combined many Jewish practices in private while demonstrating Islamic practices in public. Although enclothed in religious doctrine, the essential direction of the theology was towards assimilation. Interestingly, this idea still possesses religious significance. Nevertheless, it is likely that conversion to Islam had practical motives also; those seeking tax havens and better economic treatment, sought to join the Donme community and be recognised as Muslims, in this way they could, on the one hand, remain Jewish at heart, and on the other hand, enjoy tax benefits reserved to Muslims. It is also likely that those who had converted to Islam for pragmatic reasons prior to Sevi’s mystical apostasy later joined Donme communities feeling more comfortable there than in a purely Islamic environment. In many respects this resembled (or inspired) a later declaration by Moses Mendelsohn to be a “Jew in the home and a German in the street”, or rather in this earlier context “to be a Muslim on the street and a Jew in private”. The Donme became a home for assimilated Jews, much like the modern phenomena of mixed Jewish-Gentile couples joining Reform Temples because they are accepted there and are not in Orthodox communities. The influences of Sabbateanism can be detected in Mendelsohn’s sentiments and within the highly assimilatory program of the Enlightenment. But overt rejection of tradition would have been impossible in the strongly traditional structures of the 17th century and therefore the Donme intuitively garbed their ideas with religious/doctrinal overtones and in elaborate rituals and symbolism at least until the onset of public secularism permitted its essential nature to become public.

The Donme are notoriously secretive, this becoming a major tenet of their doctrine. This was likely because of fear of the Ottoman authorities and because they wished to preserve the many benefits they enjoyed as Muslims while knowing they were not entirely Muslim in practice. Without a doubt they also feared the criticism and the vengeance of Jewish orthodoxy which might try to spoil their situation if too much be known. Converting to Islam offered a way to break out of the millet community structure forced on minority communities by the Sultan .

Under such a system the Jewish religious leadership of the Empire – the “Haham Basi” appointed rabbinic leaders, collected tax, decided community policy and religious law and meted out justice. However disagreeable his religious decisions were for minority Jewish groups, all were required to abide by its policy. By conversion to Islam, however, one would no longer be required to heed the Jewish hierarchy and could more easily form independent community structures. Clearly, motives existed for their conversion; to be relieved from religious tyranny and also to become a part of a broad thinking and aspiring Empire.

The alleged sexual promiscuity of the Donme, along with other rituals believed to be practised by them, is in itself a fascinating study. Whether true or false? Whether part of an image which rabbinism created to delegitimise a schismatic sect, or in some way true and having some ideological merit within Sabbateanism, is still unclear. Many Donme insist that rumours of orgies on the “feast of the lamb” are baseless while some scholars argue that they were once in practice amongst more doctrinally observant Donme . Myth or fact these alleged rituals make for fascinating imagery. The “feast of the lambs” for example contains symbols and subliminal ideology. Least among them is an early exploration of women’s egalitarianism, arguably paving the way for equality of the sexes in their community in contrast to the conservatism of other Muslim groups in Turkey . If true, it would certainly have forced them into isolation from other Jews and consequently to a greater dependence on each other, if for no other reason than because their offspring were suspected of being ‘bastards’ (mamzerim) in rabbinic terms and only people of the same legal status were permitted to marry with them . On the other hand we may argue that these rumours were perpetuated as a rabbinic method to ensure that other Jews did not marry them. Unable to deny them their status as Jews, the rabbinic leadership denied them their rights to marry with other Jews, basing this on suspicions of sexual promiscuity and thereby providing a perfectly sound legal platform for their excommunication.

The Donme answered to various names such as “Maaminim” (Hebrew for ‘believers’), “Avdeti” (Arabic for ‘heretics’), “Selanikli” (from Salonika), and Sabetayci (Sabbetay). By the 19th century three strains of Donme had emerged, each with their own distinct classes and its kahal/synagogues and they were particularly represented in the Donme stronghold of Salonica.
1. Izmirim, (otherwise known as Kapanci) were the original followers of Sabetay Sevi, named after his home-town of Izmir. The Izmiris were successful in trade and prominent in the intelligentsia – they formed the aristocracy of Donme society under the name “Cavelleros”, they were highly assimilated into Ottoman society and spoke Turkish.
2. The Yakoviyim, followed Sevi’s brother Jacob believing him to be his incarnation. They were represented in lower and middle classes of Ottoman society and were commonly bureaucrats in Ottoman government.
3. The Konyoses, (otherwise known as Karakash) followed one of Sevi’s disciples Baruchia Russo believing him to be his incarnation. They were the poorest of the Donme, spoke Judeo-Spanish and were generally artisans and workers. A part of this group are believed to still practise religious rites in modern Turkey and are known as fanatical fundamentalists by the rest of the Donme.

If we interpret the Donme conversion to Islam not so much as an embrace of Islamic religious doctrine but as the desire to assimilate into the dominant society, then we may assume that with the easing of Islamic norms in modern Turkey, the Donme would not fight to remain loyal to Islam but rather adopt new practices. And although Islam does not permit the interrogation of converts and was required to accept them without question, the Donme were traditionally suspected of lacking conviction. This suspicion proved justified, as demonstrated by the ease with which Donme slipped into secularism after the Tanzimat reforms introduced by foreign pressures around the 1840s. Taxation of minorities was eased and conversion out of Islam was permitted, signalling a process of secularisation and unprecedented levels of tolerance for other worldviews on a de jure basis . Evangelical Christian groups became more active in the empire and some even exerted their strong influence on Sabbateanism, which combined Christian influences of the inquisition and influences of British millenarians making headway in the Ottoman Empire . The Donme community certainly felt less obliged to observe strict Islam and at liberty to pursue greater assimilation into an even broader system, while the reforms allowed many to return to Judaism. By that time Jews were also seeking broader cultural and ideological paradigms and a return to earlier forms sectarianism was unnecessary. Religion was no longer the predominant superstructure for society but rather a component of it; they and others identified the umbrella structure of nationalism and tolerant secular government to be the preferred paradigm permitting diverse practices and culture. It became obvious that conversion to Christianity was also not as progressive as the embrace of secularism and nationalism.

The greatest change for the Donme community occurred during the Balkan wars when Salonica passed over to Greek hands. At this point many Donme resettled in Turkish Istanbul and set up schools and communities which have left a mark on Turkish society till today. However, the forced transfer of Turks from Salonica to Turkey in 1924 was the final blow to the Donme stronghold and changed the course of Donme history. While many attempted a rapprochement with the Jewish community that would allow them to remain in Salonica as Jews not as Turks, their efforts were rejected. Rabbinic refusal to accept them back remarkably saved them from extinction along with the rest of Salonican Jewry during the Nazi occupation of Greece. Other Donme are alleged to have converted to Christianity so as to remain in Salonica but the Greek public opinion viewed the Donme as more harmful than other Turks and sought their absolute expulsion. It is therefore unclear to what extent conversion to Christianity helped them and to what extent those that remained were saved from destruction under the Nazi occupation . From the 1940s there began a strong assimilatory trend amothe Donme who resettled in Turkey. Efforts to preserve their secrecy were intensified, probably resulting from having witnessed the destruction of Greek Jewry and fear that the same could happen to them in the wake of Turkish co-operation with the Nazi regime. Fear of growing Islamic antagonism to the perceived Donme role in the overthrow of the Sultan and establishment of a secular State in Turkey further forced Donme affiliates to underplay their prominence and community network.

Though the Donme were never officially deemed to be a separate group there were signs that this might change when the 1960 Census registered them as a distinct group, primarily for taxation purposes. At the time it was believed that approximately 20,000 Donme members existed in Turkey. Some estimate their numbers to be around 50,000-60,000 today, others estimate it at 100,000. They are believed to be very prosperous but highly assimilated, with only a small minority being Sabbatean in the religious sense. They generally refer to themselves as “Salonicans” not as Sabbateans. They are extremely non-religious. The enmity of Islamic fundamentalism towards them is one of the strongest factors in the preservation of their distinct ethnic memory. Because of the high intermarriage rate the phenomenon of half-Donme is becoming increasingly well known. There have been recent efforts by partisan Donme activists to reclaim their national pride and standing in Turkish society but this has met with overall rejection, embarrassment and denial from the mainstream Donme population.

The Ottoman Empire lasted from 1299 to1920 and as it grew embraced different religions and cultures under its sovereignty. Ottomans had a long history of tolerance, and an open door policy for Jews from Spain and later from Russia. To accommodate them and other groups it developed the Quranic concept of the dhimmi to ensure the development of a method of Islamic rule, which was tolerant to different cultures. It translated into a system of minority administrations known as the millet system, whereby religious groups could rule their own people with minimal interference, while ensuring Ottoman hegemony and efficient tax collection. This system was partially successful but also left much dissatisfaction. Perhaps Sabbateanism was a form of Jewish protest against corruption of mainstream millet leadership – which was invariably controlled by the rabbinate. Perhaps the millet system ordained by the Sultan to facilitate the orderly control of minority religions bolstered an intolerant local leadership that ignored pluralism and subtleties of religious sub-groups, causing them to be stifled to such a degree that it made conversion to Islam one of the preferable remedies.

The environment in the Ottoman Empire was fertile ground in which a cross-religious movement such as Sabbateanism could sprout. The Empire was also home to Bektashism, another highly tolerant, cross-religious form of Sufi Islam which maintained particular ties to Ottomanism and also had strong ties with the Donme. These mystically oriented groups seemed to be exploring new patterns of religious and social integration. The Donme proved to be instrumental in the success of the Young Turk revolution and the formation of the secular state, while the Bektashi, for their own reasons, opposed the Young Turk revolution.

Mysticism

Despite its other characteristics, it may be argued that mysticism is in some ways a form of proto-secularism, exactly because of its mystical nature. Centuries before secularism came into existence as a concept unto itself, various social forces were conspiring to produce its seminal form. Mystics are often more interpretive of texts, allow more room for scope and tolerance, and differ from the conservative norm, being less rigid in the obedience of religious laws, more accepting of peoples believing that unity exists on a profounder level. The anti-nomian nature of Sabbateanism rejects the traditional Jewish ritual as antiquated while it embraces what was believed to be a more universal – messianic – goal, which later evolved into the tenets of secularism and democracy.

Despite the perception that mystics associate with rigid or fundamental sects, it seems that the doctrinal structures of some such groups are often more liberal than superficially thought to be. The liberal ideas and goals at the heart of such a group’s thinking are perceived by members to be under so great an attack from intolerant elements, that great efforts were taken to ensure their preservation. Rituals and rules of entry into the group were enforced. Hence groups that could well have advocated proto-liberal ideas developed rituals and rigours to protect themselves which, over time, became an integral part of the group identity and were not eased when the ideas they propagated became more tolerated or even became the norm. Hence mysticism must be viewed carefully, appreciating both its religious affiliations as well as the radical approaches that it often introduced into societies still not ready to embrace them.

Mystical Messianism of the Jewish strain commonly draws its doctrinal principles from Lurianic Kabbalah, which teaches a doctrinal system where individuals, by virtue of their own – independent - spiritual efforts combine to redeem humanity. This idea is messianic in that its final goal is the redemption of mankind, but it suffices with mystical and ritualistic efforts and does not require practical means or effort within political systems to achieve its goals. This form of messianism appears to have become popular after efforts at political messianism failed and the political circumstances for redemption were continually not forthcoming . A sense of hopelessness drove the Jewish masses that embraced kabbalistic teachings to find their redemption in a system that would no longer disappoint them. In general mysticism’s ambiguity lends itself to extreme degrees of interpretation and therefore flexibility, which we shall see lends itself to what later developed as “secularism”.

Political Messianism on the other hand is a set of political/utopian ideas drawing on classic Biblical aspirations to physically and literally rebuild Zion/the Jewish State and the Temple. In its religious context this required the establishment of the Sanhedrin and the rule of Biblical and religious law. This worldview was championed by Maimonides who saw it as a rational/ political process, providing Jews with a homeland from where they could develop and refine their religious service. In today’s context this is a fundamentalist approach that advocates a dangerously theocratic government but contextualised to the Middle Ages it represented a rational and political approach to religion and governance. The last efforts in this direction were undertaken in 16th century Safed, where the attempt to restore the ordination of what they believed would be authentic, Biblically sanctioned leaders who had the authority to renew the Sanhedrin was attempted and ultimately failed. This “political messianic” effort lasted approximately one hundred years. Its eventual failure arguably bolstered the mystical form of messianism described above and eventually fuelled Sabbatean messianism which in many ways combines both mystical and political elements.

Zionism is described by many to be a form of messianism so far as it reflects the Jewish aspirations for Jewish governance in the Jewish Homeland. But it had a distinct assimilationist theme, not so much on a personal level but on a national scale- aspiring to be like the other nations and to ‘normalise’ the Jewish people from an abnormal Exile. While clearly Zionism evolved from messianic sentiments it was not motivated out of strict religious doctrine, but the common characteristics shared with earlier types of messianic efforts cannot be ignored. It may fit into the general label of “political messianism” but because its chief proponents were highly secular in outlook, perhaps there were Sabbatean or anti-nomian messianic influences on it as well.

Tracing the Course of Messianic Doctrine

Indeed the general studyof messianism is fascinating, it has often provided the fodder, if not the motivation for much revolutionary activity. While maintaining certain distinct characteristics it has nevertheless transformed and developed various strains, rapidly becoming useful to the political dynamics in different parts of the world. It is therefore argued in this work that messianism carried important social ingredients, which for reasons described below, were deemed useful in the march for human self-perpetuation and in time adapted itself within a broaderfraeven beyond of its original form. The most documented occasion apparent is the proliferation of Christianity (Greek for messianism). Not coincidentally, messianism possessed characteristics and doctrines palatable to Rome, no doubt providing the impetus for its meteoric expansion. In addition, messianic feelings lent themselves to interpretation and a high degree of ambiguity. Their potentially anti-nomian character was especially important and is discussed below. The national interests of the Ottoman Empire were similar to those of Rome and equally well served by messianic doctrines. While the reasons that the Sabbatean experience was not as successful as the Christian messianic experience is not addressed here, the doctrinal mechanisms of Sabbateanism are the same as found in the former and are continually found in later political-religious phenomena, even in secular structures.

A mechanism was necessary to bring conquered territory and its peoples under the wings of the Ottoman Empire, thus neutralising opposition traditionally anchored in religious antagonism. So that a strong nation may emerge it was essential that Ottoman Islam develop a universal identity, incorporating the Empire’s many fragments into a broad national alliance. Because it crossed the borders of religious affiliations, a superstructure was required that on the one hand embraced these differences, while on the other hand was still giving deference to the existing Islamic sentiments at the hub of Ottoman society. If we take the above-mentioned as our premise then the Donme appear to be an ideal group serving this assimilatory purpose. If it had not emerged on its own it would have needed to be created.

Components of Religion

Considering that institutionalised messianic doctrines lay at the core of both Christianity and Islamic religions, it seems unnecessary to suggest that another form of messianism could resolve these cultural tensions, unless accompanied by unique insights and novelty specific to Sabbatean messianism. Indeed, the popularity of messianism was so widespread that it seems to be indistinguishable from the body of monotheistic faith. Judaism, Christianity and Islam are more united in the faith in a messianic time than they are about any other subject, including the doctrine of God. To be sure, there are differences in the exact formula of the messianic faith, the personality who embodies the messianic figure and the leadership structure that serves as caretaker until the messianic time arrived. Despite the differences, there exists a distinct uniformity, indicating a combination of fundamental ideas constituting an essential messianic idea. While they may be added to or subtracted from in varying degrees to suit a country, group or religion’s specific nature, there appears to be a set of closely related ideas. They have proven themselves to be a winning formula for popular appeal, agitating or uniting, consolidating and motivating masses of people, resonating amongst different groups while transcending opposing religious identities. In fact, it may be argued that religious hegemony was so successful for millennia, not because of an unquestioning respect that the masses held for ecclesiastical law in its own right, but because the religious/ruling establishment was, very early on, able to align itself and rapidly forge a strong and indelible alliance with these messianic proponents in society. While the wedding between these two camps is arguably unnatural, it was mutually complementary. Clerical leaders could proliferate ecclesiastical rule and their own power base by harnessing their strategic allies’ populist enthusiasm and interpreting it into an orderly code of living – at least until the messiah came; while on the other hand the messianic proponents were given mainstream credibility by the ecclesiastic camp. It was licensed to permeate within a larger society, and endowed with a structure and orderly caretaker hierarchy that could ensure the perpetuation of messianic ideas, even during periods of dulled messianic passion. Messianic elements thus ensured its caretaker governance and the preservation of its ideas, even though by doing so many of its principal ideas were undermined. Whether this alliance was made consciously or intuitively is of secondary importance, the ability however to identify the seams of this covenant, allows us to extrapolate that the messianic idea is a highly conductive social structure that lent itself to other – and alternative - unions. When the opportunity availed, messianic doctrine would attach itself to another emergent ruling body, in the modern case – to secularism. And this is why it may be argued that messianic elements have aligned themselves with secular governance. It is therefore not surprising to see many forms of secular messianic movements today, included among them various strains of Zionism.

Bektashi (Bektaşi) – Dönme Similarities

Ties between Sabbatean Kabbalah and esoteric Sufi Islam go back to the days of Sabetay Sevi. Schwartz goes so far as to suggest that Sabetay Sevi had participated in Bektashi rituals before his messianic declarations and imported into Judaism a “millenial, Shia influence” and that he had maintained his ties with the Bektashi, participating in their rituals . This is based on his contention that Sevi’s exile to the Balkans brought him into close contact with Bektashism. He suggests that the Bektashi Sufists strongly influenced Sabbatean behaviour and produces evidence of Bektashi worship at Sevi’s grave . That there existed a strong connection between the Bektashi of Salonica and the largest Donme community that lived there has been established by Rosanes. The Donme of Salonica found common ground with the Bektashi who shared many characteristics of Sabbateanism, or as Schwartz would have it, strongly influenced Donme practice . Schwartz notes some unique similarities between Donme and Bektashi practice including alleged deliberate violation of kashrut/halal, alleged group sex, ecstatic singing, mystical interpretations and belief in an occult reading of Torah/Qur'an, as well as the practice of collective cooked meals. There was also emphasis on the equality of women and openness to all the monotheistic faiths with a strong heterodox and almost anarchist nature as well as a unique multi-religious outlook, viewing all the monotheistic religions as one. There has been little evidence of anti-Semitism in Albanian history and few instances of collaboration with the Nazis to kill their Jews. Schwartz also asserts that Sevi became anti-nomian under Bektashi influence and was protected by the Bektashis after his conversion, who sent him to Albania where they were most powerful. Clearly this viewpoint is unduly influenced by Schwartz’s Bektashi sympathies. Nevertheless the strong affinity between the groups seems evident and one might agree that Sabbateanism and Bektashiism were inspired by similar circumstances, responding to the thirst for liberalism and the surging need to find cross-denominational paradigms to complement the Empire’s imperialism and express the collective identity volving amongst its citizens. Bektashiism was an Ottoman phenomenon with most of its rituals and prayers based on poems and songs in the Turkish language and in this respect it testifies to the assertion that various religious structures were emerging tailored to the requirements of imperial Ottomanism.

Some Reasons for the Emergence of Sabbateanism

A student of Jewish mysticism in general and Lurianic Kabbalah in particular, Sabetay Sevi declared his messiain the year 1666 and gained a popular following in the Ottoman Empire and beyond, far exceeding the size and diversity that other messianic groups had achieved till that point in Jewish history. Much has been written on the subject, but for present purposes it suffices to summarise some essential ideas associated with Sabbateanism that led to its proliferation.

They include: the abolition of many religious laws specific to the exilic nature of Jewish practice and the dismissal of melancholic and mournful habits commemorating the defeat of national Jewish life . Hence fast days were abolished and the motto of “permitting the forbidden” gained currency. Sexual liberation, breaking with traditional leadership, rejection of contemporary community structures and the embracing universal ideas followed. The movement embraced Ottoman culture by converting to Islam and assimilating into the Empire as equal citizens. Yet these ideas, including the most liberal, were still distinctively engarbed in religious and mystical doctrines and language with the requisite attendance to the theme of the national renaissance of the Jewish people - the messianic redemption. However, we can nevertheless determine, with the advantage of hindsight, that these were early expressions of liberal ideals.

Gershom Scholem tried to answer the question why, from the many tens of messianic sects emerging and then fizzling out amongst Jewish communities, the messiahship of Sabetay Sevi did not remain a local phenomenon but reverberated for many centuries to follow and spread so widely throughout the Jewish world. In his analysis Scholem attributed the cause primarily to the role played by the students of Jewish mysticism living in 16th century Safed. Safed was home to many Jewish immigrants from all over the Jewish world, including Sephardic Jews and those from neighbouring Damascus and Egypt as well as from Russia, Poland and the Ottoman Empire. Most interesting were those Spanish and Portuguese Jews exiled after the expulsion of 1492 and the communities of Marrano Jews returning to Judaism, some making their way to Safed and Jerusalem.

The diverse nature and input of these people into the Safed community was in itself unprecedented in the previous thousand years previous and perhaps it was this that contributed to two fascinating phenomena occurring there within the space of 50 years. The first was the attempt by Rabbi Jacob Berab and his school to renew the Sanhedrin (political messianism) and the second was the rapid development of Kabbalistic teaching and its dissemination (mystical messianism).

Scholem argues that the diverse backgrounds of these scholars and their need to raise funds to sustain the community of scholars necessitated the sending of ambassadors to their respective diaspora communities. These ambassadors were scholars and travelled and taught the unique Kabbalistic worldview they had learned in Safed and in this way served as a conduit for the dissemination of Lurianic Kabbalah and caused its rapid proliferation throughout the Jewish world. He continues that these teachings formed the basis of Sabbateanism and fostered messianic tensions. Sabetay Sevi, himself a scholar of Lurianic Kabbalah along with Natan of Gaza were easily able to tap into a new and vibrant religious system that waited to be harnessed by a personal Messiah. Lurianic Kabbalah presented to the Jewish world the image of Jewish suffering and redemption in a different light to what was previously taught by the strict worldview of the rabbis and halakhism. Kabbalistic interpretation allowed for great scope, its commentary on religious texts was often entirely re-interpretive, it presumed an active human role in the dynamics of God which made human activity holy in itself. It recognised an essential unity of all things in the infinity of God that enabled a tolerance for superficial differences in the material world. These remained mystical doctrines in isolated Safed but would future, become useful political tools professing ethnic and religious tolerance in the Ottoman Empire. The teachings were finding their way to that Empire and would become politically activated with Sevi’s messianic declaration.

Sabbatean Evolution

Sabbateanism developed in the atmosphere of defeat that the Ottomans suffered at the gates of Vienna in 1683. It is likely that the atmosphere in the Empire affected the growth of the movement. The Sultans quickly understood that if the Empire did not adopt Western techniques and adopt the best of French engineering, medicine and science they would continue to lose wars. But it was more than a century and a half later that Sultans like Mahmut II in 1826 started movements to openly adopt Western culture. In 1839 Sultan Abdul Mecid extended equal citizenship to all the citizens of the Empire, without religious or ethnic distinction ensuring that all citizens could bear witness in court even against a Muslim, could hold government office and serve in the high ranks of the army. The Donme were important beneficiaries of this process, growing and enjoying swift assimilation into Ottoman life.

On the other front, the relationship of the Donme to the Jews was tense. Their need to defend themselves from religious Jewish polemic inspired the rapid spread of print, the encouraging of scholarship and the continued study of Jewish mysticism and theological literature. At the same time, the Jewish religious authorities banned the study of mysticism and repressed Sabbatean influence while turning inwards. Some attribute the decline of Ottoman Jewry to the crisis born in the wake of Sabetay Sevi’s messianic claims and apostasy. Sabbatean - messianic expectations are believed to have neautralised the entrepreneurial spirit of many believers who expected to be magically whisked away from exile to redemption. This view does not accurately depict the sociological structures of messianic groups and is unlikely to be the entire cause for the economic degeneration of Ottoman Jewry. On the contrary, communities of believers and minority sects are often able to develop strong networks and loyalties allowing them to strengthen their economic activity. Further, contrary to common thinking that messianics are dreamy-eyed and unworldly, messianic beliefs are often rooted in strong cultural and social networks and provide both an excellent infrastructure and motivation for commerce . This was the case with the Donme. Perhaps the mainstream Jewish communities, which were influenced by Sabbatean thinking but remained under rabbinic leadership, went through a greater crisis as they were required to go to great lengths to weed out the potentially heretical elements still active in their midst.

It is this process which was damaging for Ottoman Jewry. The efforts to censor certain religious and kabbalistic texts is well documented, the oppression of the imaginative faculties, freedom and creativity of the community members left its mark on Ottoman Jewry . Ties with undesireable elements were cut, suspicions and paranoia raged against those who were believed to be secret Sabbateans and the community turned inwards, leaving a sense of depression amongst the Ottoman Jewish communities. In the meantime other minorities of the Empire became more adept in their commercial dealings and were helped by their religious structures particularly the Greek Orthodox church and the Armenian Orthodox structures. The Donme who converted to Islam, now free of the Jewish millet control over their activities, quickly emerged as an important and functional community in the wider society. The repressed Jewish communities were probably relieved to find alternatives to their oppressive leadership in secularism and so, indirectly, the oppression brought on by rabbinic reactions to Sabbateanism also influenced the Jewish support for the Young Turk revolution.

In a fascinating instance of a Jewish class conflict in the 1840s Izmir, the poorer Jews reacted to the extortion of the wealthy meat merchants who charged them high meat taxes first by embargoing them and finally by eating non-kosher meat. A more extreme actwas the mass conversion of 80 families to Protestantism and the preparedness of another 2000 to do the same, so as to avoid the millet authority of the Jewish leadership and its taxes and oppression. While no overt mention of Sabbateanism is found, it seems more than coincidental that this occurred in Sabetay Sevi’s home town, that the consumption of non-kosher meat was a Sabbatean practice ; that so many people were willing to convert out of Judaism is almost Sabbatean/Frankist in style . One might view this as a testament to the effects and influences that Sabbateanism was having on the Jewish communities and how it legitimised the breaking with ritual law and endorassimilation for motives of personal benefit. Even though the Jewish community broke with overt Sabbateanism, precedents were set and the infrastructure was placed for Jews to exit the observance of ritual law. This correlated with its freedom from the often oppressive practices of the religious leadership and was reinforced by the success of the Donme communities in the general society and their gradual re-acceptance by mainstream Jewish elements.

In contrast to the repression of religious freedom in places like Italy and Ashkenaz, Benayahu argues that the Salonican Jewish community did not take part in the repression of study and printing of kabbalistic texts . It seems no coincidence that Salonikan Jews were highly active and intellectual, successful and quite secular. The vitality of the print industry that was long active there might have later helped the Young Turks. It may be argued that the tolerance for mystical teachings in Salonica prompted the willingness for far reaching exercises in textual interpretation and imaginative exploits and was accompanied by a dislike for rigid fundamentalism .

By the 19th century the Jewish communities were strong after a period of lull. Jewish relations with the Donme, particularly in Ottoman Salonica were friendly; the community distinctions were even blurred. Critics might not have differentiated between the groups thus when someone was suspected of being Jewish it is as likely that they were Donme. The extent that Sabbatean doctrine and influence specifically permeated the Jewish (non-Donme) community is unclear, as there existed no overt structures for these ideas. However, the more universal attitudes of the Jews and their embrace of Turkish life might testify to remnants of attitudes espoused in Sabbateanism. Both communities were strongly represented in the political and economic life of Salonica .

Jacob Berab, Political Messianism and the Impetus for Sabbateanism

Finally; there was another reason for the proliferation of Sabbateanism and the reasons why Lurianic Kabbalah was so geared to Sabbatean messianic feelings. The little-researched events in Safed surrounding the attempted renewal of the semikhah and the re-establishment of the Sanhedrin in the year 1538 reflected messianic aspirations of a more rational/political kind. Jacob Berab and his followers, including the renowned halakhist Joseph Karo and others who later became staunch students of Lurianic Kabbalah, supported these political moves to inspire a Jewish religious enlightenment in the Holy Land and establishing a supreme religious authority to interpret halakhah according to their needs . The appointment of ordained leadership and the efforts to develop a worldview to complement this renaissance eventually failed to attract a critical mass. This failure is often attributed to the objections raised by opponents whos

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Studies on Christianity “Judaizing” and Christianity: Preservation of a Minority Trend By M. Avrum Ehrlich The following article traces the generations of “Judaizing” in Christian history. The phenomenon of “judaizing” within Christianity is not new. Though the term itself misleadingly insinuates something foreign to Christian civilisatc responsibilities lost currency. The messianic formula of the sanhedrinists had too many practical implications of governance and bureaucracy unsuitable to their scholarly/pietistic leanings. The administrative realities of their aspirations were too demanding and incongruous with their personalities and one of the reasons that the initiative faded. Their messianic doctrines would however be useful for later groups. Secularism and Sabbateanism It is indeed curious and unlikely to be coincidental that the same Ottoman Empire that opened its arms to the expelled Jews of Spain and the conversos of the inquisition should become the host to one of the most fascinating examples of mass voluntary apostasy in Jewish history. The Sultan was famed for welcoming the Jews saying: “Spain’s loss was my gain”. They were integrated into society and enjoyed a high degree of equality with the Muslim majority. It appears as no coincidence that Sabbateanism emerged as Ottomanism was at its peak and indeed it may be viewed in manways as an uniquely Ottoman religion, adopting and drawing on local practices and myth, mannerisms and language, drawing from the mysticism of the Turkish Sufi-Bektashi order. The development of religious mannerisms and mythology to complement and be complemented by the national motherland is a common phenomenon and is seen also in Mormonism which also developed as a homegrown religion adapting and developing Christian consensus to the American condition. The Turkish nature of Sabbateanism may be illustrated by the description of Sabetay Sevi during his visit to the Sultan "dressed as a poor Turk" parading symbols of Islam, including a green sash symbolic of the "Green Man" of Islam . Even though we argue that Sabbateanism was working in the direction of rationalism and secularism, without any doubt this was possible only by extreme and dogmatic faith in its goals and belief in the messiahship of Sevi. It appears that however “enlightened” the eventual goals, it is accompanied by formative surges of pure faith, to the extent of fanaticism, a dynamic which proves itself critical in the formation of powerful social movements. The followers of Sabetay Sevi were renowned for their intolerance of his detractors, persecuting them and throwing them out of their towns. Dogmatic faith in the principles of a group is demanded, at least of a hard core group, as a guarantor of its survival. This is not an apologetic for messianic fervour but an observation about some of the more harmonious outcomes that may sprout from them after their period of consolidation is complete. Restricting ourselves to Judaism we find that two of her greatest secular-revivalist movements, Enlightenment and Secular Zionism, show distinct messianic characteristics indicating its ideological inspiration. In somewhat ironic contrast, the majority of present-day Orthodox groups as well as a majority of the rightist Settlement population in Israel show, contrary to popular belief, distinct non-messianic signs and even contempt towards it, although there are significant exceptions to this trend. Sabbateanism and Zionism Over the last decade many Israeli scholars and social commentators have made the association between secular Zionism and messianism. No less today than in the early days of its activities, secular Zionism – and the Israeli Left in particular – show distinctive utopian aspirations that in many ways resemble forms of religious Jewish messianism, oddly enough bolstered by an almost religious dogmatism. Despite a declared and articulate opposition to conservative orthodoxy and religious messianism, this group seems to have unconsciously adopted many messianic characteristics and uses almost religious symbolism to address its message. In contrast with the early Zionists whose goal was a secular political messianism aimed at establishing a political State and securing sovereign territory by force of arms as an essential premise, the latter manifestation of the Israeli Left has more mystical messianic leanings. On one hand the Israeli Left acknowledges its national aspirations for Jewish sovereignty in the Land of Israel, on the other it supports extreme territorial compromise with Israel’s enemies. These two values are often perceived to negate one another. In a situation which is quite possibly un-resolvable in real-politick, it is however, considered entirely possible – and likely – in the paradigm of peace that the Leftist movement professes. Most interesting is the movement’s choice of messianic terminology when describing the peace process with Israel’s Arab neighbours, including; “new world order in the Middle East”, an uncanny political rendition of the messianic “kingdom of heaven on earth”. “Peace of the brave” is another term which incorporates two messianic ideals, the common theme of peace that God will bless his people with and the bravery required of the Warrior Messiah and his soldiers fighting for redemption . Another common term is “sacrifices for peace” referring to Israeli citizens killed in terrorist attacks under Left Wing governments, while the government continued to defend its pacifist policies arguing that it was all worth it as the nation was on the verge of peace, the fallen being the necessary sacrifice. Another term is “contractions” like that of a mother in childbirth, which echo messianic terminology of the suffering before the messianic age and evoking the religious significance of suffering in bringing the messianic process to a head. “Just a bit more” is reference to territory that many argue must be ceded to push the scales and bring about peace with Israel’s neighbours. This resembles midrashic analogies that ‘one extra deed can tip the scales’, and may bring about the messianic times. Just as the ‘dwarf on the shoulders of a giant’ offers that little bit more height to view into the messianic age. “Just a bit more” money, deeds, action, or whatever the messianic currency was, could tip the scales. Whether the “Peace Now” campaigns of the Israeli left preceded the “Moshiach Now” campaign of the Lubavitch movement is secondary to their common inspiration for a messianic redemption. Both messianic movements linked their dreams and desires in the little explored concepts they enthusiastically extolled. Most interesting is the extreme anti-nomian nature of the Israeli Left Wing. A new dimension to anti-nomianism was created in this mutation of messianism that extended beyond the rejection of Jewish ritual into a form of national anti-nomianism. There existed an overwhelming pressure on believers amongst the Israeli Left not only to neglect Jewish tradition but a fundamental imperative to forfeit Jewish sovereignty particularly over Jewish religious sites (Cave of Joseph, Cave of Machpela, Temple Mount) by which peace was directly achievable. Furthermore, a curious similarity between the Israeli Left and the Sabbatean movement is illustrated in the Left’s strong public ties with Arabs and Islam while privately rejecting and even despising their lifestyle, morality and habits. Stark similarities are evident with the Donmeh who showed great public affection with Islam but amongst themselves entirely rejected and even despised Islam. This of course is not so much because of causal influences that Sabbateanism had on Zionism but rather because the same impulses and mechanisms active in both groups. The belief that assimilation was an important utopian/messianic goal is therefore argued to be a motivation in both Sabbatean and Left Wing Zionist messianism. The difference between the theory and practice of this ‘assimilation doctrine’ however is in the ability to carry the process to untraceable ends and complete assimilation. Both the Donmeh and the Israeli Left, despite their assimilatory ideals and not for lack of trying, remained culturally unassimilated from their target groups. Ottoman Jews and Dönme Involvement in Zionism It is difficult to show active Donme involvement in the history of the Zionist movement. A certain amount of general Sabbatean sentiment permeated the Zionist ethos though it is not entirely clear if there was a direct link between the two and whether Sabbatean elements as an entire group actively supported Zionism. It appears however that there was sympathy. Sabbatean influence on Zionism was not necessarily restricted to the Ottoman Empire, and while the Polish and German Zionists could just as easily been Sabbatean inspired, this discussion is lto Ottoman Sabbateanism. The proposition being that some Zionists might have assumed that the Donme were more readily tolerant to their cause than the Jewish community, and that they were kindred spirits who shared so much common ethos was the single strongest motive for an alliance. Official Zionism came to Turkey after 1908, with the explicit purpose of gaining Jewish community support to help establish a Jewish state in Palestine. It built a network in Turkey to convince the new secular Turkish regime of the importance of Zionism for their own cause . It was believed the ruling Progress Party would see in Zionism an ally, the shared secular aspirations, nationalism and geographic proximity to one another were the foundations of this desired alliance. Zionists worked on all these fronts. The Zionists sought to use the general infighting within the Turkish Jewish community to gain a foothold of their own. They courted both those disappointed with the dominant French affiliated Alliance Israelite Universelle as well as those disappointed with the conservative religious leadership. The school system established by the Alliance Israelite Universelle to advance Jewish culture in the spirit of the French revolution, opposed Zionism for the same reasons that many Jews of the Enlightenment did; it represented dual national interests. Benbassa points out that the Alliance was less progressive than its local adherents were and many supported it, lacking any other alternative. While the Alliance leadership was opposed, there appears to have been a growing support for Zionism, particularly amongst the ranks of students emerging from these schools, among them many Donme. The power structures of Ottoman Jewish communities were elaborate, with the conservative structures and rabbinic councils and the “Haham Basi” (chief rabbinate in Istanbul) being threatened by the Alliance. The traditional leadership had tense relations with Zionist elements about community authority in the Holy Land. The millet structure gave the Haham Basi authority which the new settlers in Palestine rejected. It reached a degree where the Haham Basi of Jerusalem – Raphael Efendi - complained to the Turkish Foreign Minister that the Ashkenazi Jews of the Holy Land were not obeying the laws of the Jewish community and the millet community structure over which he lorded. Differences were not only the result of ethnic, Ashkenazi-Sephardi mores but because the immigrants to the Holy Land were shedding religious observance altogether in favour of socialism and secularism. Despite attempts to work with them, including Herzl’s twice successful appeal to Haham Basi – Moshe Levi - to get an audience with the Sultan (1902) to discuss the question of Jewish autonomy in Palestine, the relationship soured. It is curious that Israel’s first and second Prime Ministers, David Ben Gurion and Moshe Sharett and her second president Yitzchak Ben Zvi had lived and studied in Istanbul and embraced the concept “lehitatmen”, Hebrew for “to become an Ottoman”. Ben Zvi is alleged by some to be descendent of a Sabbatean family . Sharett served in the Ottoman army in WW1. Ben Gurion gave up Russian citizenship for Ottoman citizenship, something many others in Palestine were afraid to do. Israeli Presidents Ben Zvi, Zalman Shazar and to a lesser degree Yitzchak Navon became students of Ottomanism. The first two undertook research and wrote important works on Sabbateanism, indicating that the subject touched a nerve with their own identities as Jews who were deeply attached to their traditions, possessing messianic – Zionist aspirations but not religiously observant. For many, the identification, study and sympathy towards Sabbateanism permitted them a connection with Jewish history, doctrine and the aspirations for national renaissance without ritual commitment. In many ways this resembled what has often been said of the study of Jewish historiography popularised in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The study of Jewish history instead of the practise of religious ritual allowed enlightened Jews to attach themselves to the Jewish nation while not compromising their rejection of religious doctrine. The same may be said of the study of Sabbateanism and in this respect it ranks as an important source of inspiration for secular Zionism. For these reasons it follows that Zionism’s secular nature indicated a potential for its proponents to develop a strong fraternity with Sabbatean elements or an affinity with its system of ideas greater than with mainstream Jewish religion. But clearly, open relationships with the Donme would have entirely alienated orthodox support for Zionism and in this respect if it existed, it must have been kept secret. Jews, Dönme and the Young Turk Revolution On the face of it, participation of Ottoman Jewry in the Young Turk revolution seems like an instinctive thing for a minority to do. It was a way to ensure equality and complete integration into the national structures of Turkey, without discrimination on the basis of religion or ethnicity. A similar process occurred amongst the Palestinian Christians of the same period who supported the Pan-Arabian – Baath party uniting around a secular, non-Islamic national agenda which embraced all Arabs, regardless of religious inclinations . But the Jews and the Donme were the only minorities to support the Young Turk initiative and did so in high numbers with astounding loyalty and success, while the Armenians and Greeks of the Empire chose to dissent. This raises the possibility that more profound reasons were uniquely at play in Jewish political thinking. Feroz Ahmad argued that because Jews, unlike Christian minorities did not enjoy foreign protection, they wholeheartedly put their destiny in with the Union and Progress Party. The Donme therefore, as an entirely Turkish phenomenon and more isolated than the Jews, with no international support, would more easily throw in their destiny with the Progress Party. Both feared annexation to a Christian controlled Greece, preferring Islam and a secular Turkish State . This arguably also taps into latent Sabbatean doctrine and its deep attachment to Turkish culture, secularism, assimilation and a desire to see their messianic doctrines defined within the national renaissance of Turkey. The Ottoman Empire included a mixed stock of Italians, Greeks, Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Circassians, Georgians, Armenians and Jews; local and immigrants. This internationalism was reinforced by the habit of the Ottoman sovereigns to marry only with foreign women. Desirable and intelligent technicians were imported or co-opted into administrative and military ranks provided they accepted Islam or they were collected from the Balkans at the age of eight and raised as Muslims in special schools and prepared for all sorts of official ranks. This climate was convenient for people of Sabbatean origin and facilitated their integration in Ottoman society without being unduly noticed. But while others assimilated quickly, the Sabbatean – Donme preserved their community structures, becoming a force to be reckoned in economics and politics until the population transfer of all Turks (including Donmes) from Salonica to Istanbul in 1924, where the community again became less public. With the course of WWII and after the death of Ataturk, the Turkish establishment was influenced by Hitler's racial theories. A special wealth tax law was enacted. In practice, non-Moslem minorities (Jews, Armenians, Greeks) were arbitrarily taxed and even the Donme, to a lesser extent, were identified for taxation purposes . From that date onwards, the emerging Islamic fundamentalist elements contested the Donme’s identity as Turks. The religious press attacked the Republic, its founder Ataturk, and the secular nature of the regime. They never forgave the Donme for their role in the secular revolution and they became a convenient target for hatred. Over the last sixty years it is this hatred and racist rhetoric in the guise of Arab nationalism which constantly reminded Sabbateans of their racial heritage, otherwise complete asinto secular Islam might have been possible. Other slurs made against the Donme at this time both indicate their problems of self-identity and the degree to which their influence in the Young Turk revolution was felt. Baer describes this in an important review of a recent work by Donme activist Ilgaz Zorlu “Yes, I am a Salonican” claiming significant Donme secret life in present-day Turkey. While vehemently denied by modern Donmeh proponents, the issues raised in this and other works, indicating the extent of Donme influence in Modern Turkey, has caused fierce criticism from Islamists comparable to the period in the early part of the century when the Donme were the focus of large public scrutiny and criticism . In 1924 a Donme from Salonica named Karaka Mehmed Rufltu wrote an expose of his community to the Grand National accusing 10-15000 Donme of acting like Muslims in public but secretly maintaining their own rituals. He accused them of unwillingness to sacrifice for their country and being parasites off the country. He argued that the Donme must assimilate and marry with other Turks and share all aspects of the fatherland or leave Turkey. In a ten part rebuttal to these claims called “A Mysterious Page of History” published in the paper “Vatan” it was described how assimilated the Donme were and how willing they were to become a part of Turkish life. The extent to which Jews were involved in the Young Turk revolution is debated, some arguing that Jews and Donme dominated the Committee of the Union and Progress Party (C.U.P) which gained control of the State . Others argue that this was anti-Semitic rhetoric and exaggerated and that while the Jews supported the revolution on a grass roots level, they were not highly represented in the upper echelons of the party . Indeed British diplomats did report to the home office that a Jewish-Masonic conspiracy was at work favouring the revolution . The Donme are believed to have been equally involved in the revolution but exact details are less known due to a number of reasons. Many Donme were cursorily described as Jews by observers lacking an appreciation for the subtleties of the two communities. The general secrecy of the community and its increased secrecy after WWII and the threats of Islamic fundamentalism, peppered with assimilation trends and extreme secularism, makes documentation difficult. The fear of reprisal by fundamentalist groups in Modern Turkey has left the remnants of Donme communities less willing to testify to their role in the revolution. Rumours were always extant that key activists in the revolution were of Donme stock; even Ataturk was alleged by some to have Donme ancestry . It was via the Masonic lodges that the Donme, the Jews, Bektashi and secularists who were less accepted in mainstream society were able to meet on an equal footing, many of them becoming major instruments of the revolution. Salonica was a nest of revolutionary sentiments and home to its major figures. It is no coincidence that it was also home to the strongest Donme and most vibrant Jewish community of the Empire. Coopermans’ description is apt: “Salonica afforded an eclectic and often, but not exclusively, cosmopolitan environment where Dervis sects crossed paths with the Donme, where Jewish and Turkish businesses were interspersed on the same streets, and where commercial and municipal courts were mixed. Here, where the Jewish Masonic organizations supported the creation of Muslim – Turkish lodges, and where Muslim – Turkish newspapers supported the election of Jewish municipal assembly candidates, was the source the combination of inter-communal energies which gave the revolution of 1908 its impetus” . The Donme served as a bridge between the Jewish community and the Turks which made winners all-round, improving the Jewish position, helping the revolution and bringing the Donme back to a degree of acceptance amongst Jews . Their assimilationist attitude had won them equal footing with Muslims as well as opportunities to make inroads into public life without being marked or discriminated as a Jew. Their educational doctrine was conducive to public works and revolutionary activity. They must have seen this period as a window of opportunity, their accounts of them becoming less secretive and more publicly minded. The Great Mosque (Yeni Camii) built by the Donme in Salonica in 1903 was a public face of loyalty to Islam. Whether indicating that they no longer needed to worship in secret because their Jewish rites were less important than in the past is a subject of discussion, but secrecy was becoming less characterisitc . The Donme have been described as “full of ardour for action …at the avant-garde of civilisation …ideas of justice and progress” . Mehmet Cavit Bey (1875-1926) was one of the most significant Donme political figures. He was active in the revolution as a highly articulate editor of a tabloid and professor of finance and was three times Finance Minister of Modern Turkey until his execution for his alleged role in the assassination attempt of Ataturk . It is believed that Cavit Bey was an ardent Zionist and saw the advantages for Turkey in the Jewish settlement of Palestine . Articles appeared that showed ardent support both for the Turc revolution and Zionism, as if part of the same process . Revolutionary activists Leon Gattegno and a Donme friend Mazlum Hakki, published a journal in Paris entitled “Resad” under the pseudonym of “sucro” and sent it to the great powers, condemning the Sultan’s government . In an article in the C.U.P journal “Mechveret Suppliment Francais” the Donme were mentioned to be the only group in Salonica active on behalf of the C.U.P and the revolution . Another article describes the Donme as one of the most modernised groups in the empire . According to Pukru Haniolu, about five people appear active in the Salonican branch of the C.U.P. Two were Jewish and two of possible Donme descent. Emmanuel Karasu was Grand Master of the Macedonia Risorta Masonic Lodge and invited Muslims and Donme to join the lodges of the Empire sheltering them and providing them with a framework to disseminate their ideas. Avram Galante was a writer and participated in the Second Turk Congress in Paris in 1907. Ferdinand Efendi, an Ottoman of Greek descent and possibly Donme. A man called Archbolo whose ethnic descent is unknown, and another who had a Muslim name but might also have been Donme . Dr Nazim, Nuzhet Faik, Mustafa Arif, Muslihiddin Adil, Sukru Bleda, Halide Edip Adivar and Ahmet Emin Yalman were all active in the Young Turks and of Donme families. Mehmet Kapanci (1839-1924) who was a mayor of Salonica and a well-known banker funded the C.U.P and was a Donme. Other Jews active in the Young Turks were Nissim Mazliah from Izmir and Vitali Faradji , Moise Cohen (later called Munis Tekinalp) who was an active Jew and once rabbinical student who turned to business and actively asserted a proud Turkish identity along with Zionist sentiments. Other Jews and Donme served as ranking officers in the Turkish army. Jews had always been represented in Ottoman parliaments but there had been a significant rise after the revolution reflecting their degree of participation . Unable to work together in their respective religious environments, The Jews and Donme appeared to have met and fraternised within the Masonic lodge. Because of the rigid initiation rites the fear of espionage by the Sultan was less in such an environment and it was here that revolutionary sentiments and activity fermented. Whether the suspicions that Masonry is responsible for sedition and subversive activities are true or not, in this context they were a convenient home for the revolution, providing lodges and personnel, secrecy and structures for the revolution. The Donme thrived in the Masonic environment, allowing them to be both secretive and influential, maintaining their religious ideas in a non-dogmatic atmosphere. Bridging the gap between the Jews and the Muslims, they seemed to represent the happy medium of the secular Young Turk revolution. Even today Donme are involved in the Masonic Lodof Turkey. Sahir Talat Akev of the Kapanci-Izmir group of Donme was the Grand Master of the Masons until his death in 1999. In Salonica of 1879 the Kapanci Donme set up a private school system called “Terakki Mektebi” (“progress” named after the revolutionary “Progress Party” and suggesting the strong share of its ethos) which became a model for other private schools in Turkey. It was transferred to Istanbul after the population transfer and has become one of the best- known private high schools (called Sisli Terakki Lisesi). Similarly, the Karakash Donme founded the Fevziye Mektebi School and recently founded a university by the name of Isik Universitesi. It comes as no surprise that the Donme are today blamed by Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey for the secular revolution and spurned with hatred as being a group that infiltrated its way into Islam in order to destroy it. The ‘prosperity party’ representing these views in Turkish parliament have also fiercely attacked Israel. They got 22% of the vote in 1996 becoming the largest single political party. They were shut down by the constitutional court of Turkey but re-emerged as the ‘Virtue Party’ which got 17% of the vote in 1999. Considering its Islamic heritage and the environment of Arab hatred for Israel, it is remarkable that Turkey has fostered such strong ties with Israel and the causes for it may well be traced to the Donme influence. Donme members today represent the elite of society within Turkey and it is the fear of being discovered that created the intense secrecy around them. Their increased secrecy and influence continues to circularly feed the hatred and suspicion surrounding them. At present there are some well-known Donme families and other less known families occupying important positions in Modern Turkish life. The current Foreign Minister Mr. Ismail Cem is a Donme though some of his family members have officially come out and declared that although they are of Donme ethnicity they disassociate from the cultural group . These include relatives: Cepil Ipekci, a famous fashion designer in Turkey and Nukhet Izet Ipekci, daughter of the famous journalist Abdi Ipekci, who declared on an Islamic channel that her parents were of Donmeh origins . Others such as the industrialists; the Dilber and Bezmen families are Donme. Rahsan Ecevit, wife of Prime Minister Bilent Ecevit is a Donme. First ever, female Prime Minister Tansu Ciller is half Donme on her mother’s side. Altan Oymen, past leader of the Republican People’s Party was of Donme descent. Other prominent personalities ranging from well known writers, journalists, film makers, professors, lawyers, judges, bureaucrats (legal and foreign service), bankers, industrialists are of Donme origin. They can almost be said to be the standard bearers of secularism and modern Turkish nationalism that is based on cultural unity rather than racial characteristics. They are more advanced in this process than secular Turkish Jews and in many ways resemble the prominence and thinking of the European Jewish Enlightenment leading many to suspect that Sabbateanism played a role there too. Donme sympathy towards Jews exists but association is not common because of the fears of being further tainted by Islamic fundamentalism. This fear is becoming increasingly real as the Islamic party grows. Modern Turkey’s Relations with Israel Modern Turkey has been unusually friendly in its relationship with Israel, in contrast to other Islamic states. This is especially unique as it is a key country in the region and had to resist strong neighbouring Islamic pressures to do so. While Gruen argues that it did so because it believed that suthe emergent Israeli state would be a stabilising factor in the Middle East, one cannot help but wonder if it reflected the attitude of a country influenced by its famous Jewish sectarian group, the Donme. Immediately after Israel’s independence, Turkey signed a postal agreement with Israel, forbade any Turkish citizens from joining the war for or against Israel and on the 15 September 1948 the Turkish government lifted the ban on travelling to Israel, allowing any Turkish citizen to immigrate there. It co-operated with the Jewish Agency to facilitate Jewish immigration and half the Jewish population of approximately 50,000 people left creating a 100,000 strong Turkish Jewish population in Israel today. Turkey was a member of the commission for Palestinian conciliation and as an Islamic country was expected to take an anti-Israel position. Under the representation of the intellectual Huseyin Cahit Yalcin, Turkey proved to be very supportive of the fledgling State. Yalcin had been friendly with Ben Gurion and there are many reasons to believe that his intellectual background brought him into contact with many Jews and Donme of Turkey. That he became the step-father of Mehmet Cavit Bey’s son Siar Yalcin after Bey’s execution in 1926 leads us to seriously suppose that his connections with the Donme were stronger than is publicly known. His initial concern with supporting Israel had been that Israel represented foreign interests in the region, those fears were allayed, and Turkey formally recognised the State of Israel on 28th March 1949, embassies, trade and direct flights followed. Certainly Turkey felt that it had much to gain by supporting Israel. By supporting Israel and the Jewish state they showed themselves to the world as supporters of secularism and enlightenment. The perception that Jews were powerful and influential both in Turkey and the U.S reigned. The agreement was signed only a few days before the Turkish foreign minister met with American President Truman, who himself supported the partition plan of Palestine and was helped by many Jews. The appointment of Henry Morgenthau, a Jewish – American as ambassador in Turkey, during the early part of the century had reinforced this perception. Israel’s relations with Turkey were not always smooth and not always public. Pressure from Arab countries forced it to greater discretion. Ben Gurion described the relationship as one with a mistress and not an open relationship. The Turkish continued the metaphor that ‘a man may love his mistress more than his wife, but appearances have to be kept up’ noting that ‘the Arab wife brings with it a large dowry ‘ making reference to trade and oil. By the 1990’s 60,000 Israeli tourists per year travelled to Turkey and this has risen even higher since. There are academic, intelligence and military exchanges and a strong strategic alliance is in place. Conclusion The remnants of the Dönme have few overt messianic signs. Few go any longer to the seashore raising their hands and calling out in Spanish “Sabatey Sabetay we await thee”. They are predominantly secular and liberal and highly assimilated. They are predominantly atheist and at best only culturally Sabbatean. Whether the mystical designs of Sabbatean doctrine intended to form such a community is secondary to the fact that mystical doctrine outside of a protected environment contains highly liberal characteristics. As a group, the Dönme assimilated, leaving only a shadow of their doctrinal selves. Sabbateanism, despite its mystical nature and its roots in sectarianism sowed the seeds of tolerance, assimilation, interpretation, anti-fundamentalis and universalism within Judaism and in wider circles and in so doing was a proto-secular group, instrumental in laying down the ideological infrastructure for other Jewish groups to follow. It is clear that messianism changes form and has moved from working within religious frameworks to working within highly secular frameworks. With this in mind the messianic tendencies of secular and political groups can be better understood, as can be an appreciation of their ideological architecture. BIBLIOGRAPHY Baer, Marc David, “Revealing a Hidden Community: Ilgaz Zorlu and the Debate in Turkey over the Donme/Sabbateans” The Turkish Studies Association, Vol 23, Spring 1999 1, pp 68-75. Barnai, Jacob, “The Spread of the Sabbatean Movement in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries”, Communication in the JDiaspora the Pre-Modern World. Ed. by Sophia Menachem. (Leiden, 1996) 313-337 Barnai, Jacob, “Messianism and Leadership; the Sabbatean Movement and the Leadership of the Jewish Communities the Ottoman Empire”, Ottoman and Turkish Jewry; Community and Leadership. Ed. by Aron Rodrigue. (Bloomington, 1992), 167-182 Barnai, Jacob, “From Sabbateanism to Modernization; Ottoman Jewry on the eve of the Ottoman Reforms and the Haskala”, in Sephardi and Middle Eastern Jewries; History and Culture in the Modern Era. Ed. By Harvey E. Goldberg. (Bloomington,1996) 73-80 Jacob Barnai, “The Outbreak of Sabbateanism – The Eastern European Factor”, The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Vol 4 pp 171-183 Carlebach, Elisheva, “Sabbatianism and the Jewish-Christian Polemic”, World Congress of Jewish Studies (WCJS) 10,C2 (Jerusalem, 1990) 1-7 Idel, Moshe, “Saturn and Sabbetai Tzevi: a New Approach to Sabbateanism” in Jewish Studies 37 (Jerusalem, 1997) pp 147-160. Katz, Jacob, “The Suggested Relationship between Sabbatianism, Haskalah, and Reform”, Divine Law in Human Hands (Jerusalem, 1998) 504-530 Katz, Jacob, Divine Law in Human Hands; Case Studies in Halakhic Flexibility, (Jerusalem, 1998) Katz, Yossef, “Paths of ZioniPolitical Action in Turkey, 1882-1914; the plan for Jewish settlement in Turkey in the Young Turks era”, International Journal of Turkish Studies 4,1 (1987) 115-135 Kushner, David, “Mustafa Kemal and his period in the eyes of the Hebrew press and publications in Palestine”, International Journal of Turkish Studies 3,2 (1985-1986) 95-106 Liebes, Yehuda, “Sabbatean messianism”, Studies in Jewish Myth and Jewish Messianism (Albany, 1993) 93-106, 177-182 Stavroulaki, Nikos, “Shabbetai Zevi and the "Donme" of Thessaloniki”, Forum on the Jewish People, Zionism and Israel 53. (Jerusalem,1984) 103-114 Zorlu Ilgaz, Evet Ben Selaniklyim (Yes, I am a Salonican), (Istanbul, 1998) 7 Days (Hebrew weekly) 20-5-1999 Jerusalem (Hebrew Local Weekly) 22-3-96 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1. My thanks are due to Denis Ojalvo from Istanbul and to Donme activists Ilgaz Zorlu and B. Selim Iz for their interesting thoughts and references. Thanks to Dr Gad Nasi of the Turkish Community in Israel and Yuri Yomtov for their bibliographical suggestions. Appreciation to Yakov Leib, moderator and teacher of the Donme West Web Site who, through his efforts to disseminate Sabbatean teachings provides information and important archives as well as a platform for lay-people and academics alike to study Sabbatean and ‘neo-Sabbatean’ subjects. 2. See Gershom Scholem, Sabbatai Sevi: The Mystical Messiah, 1626-1676 (Princeton, 1976) and Jacob Katz, “The Suggested Relationship between Sabbatianism, Haskalah, and Reform”, Divine Law in Human Hands (Jerusalem, 1998) 504-530. 3. The extent of their assimilatory nature is arguable, its existence to some degree is not. Haskalla advocated various forms of cultural assimilation, the Reform movement advocated religious and liturgical assimilation and Zionism advocated varying forms of national assimilation. 4. The well documented “witch hunts” after secret Sabbateans and the repression of Sabbatean influence is the best evidence that their doctrine was felt and feared amongst the traditional Jewish communities. 5. In personal communications with Turkish Donme. 6. Islam traditionally does not put into question the sincerity of converts “those who call anyone who makes hadith an unbeliever is himself an unbeliever. Considering that there is no notion of insincere conversion in Islam, it is surprising that the Donme should be considered or be called Islamic unbelievers and perhaps the name refers to their heresy of Judaism. 7. The Millet System of minority religious autonomy was the application of the dhimma contract prescribed in the Quran to protect the ‘people of the book’ (dhimmi). In many ways it was superior to any other method employed by Christian civilisation in the East or West. It was an enlightened means of preserving the identity of minority groups and securing their religious liberties. It allowed Jews, Catholics and Orthodox Christianity to ensure their distinctions and preserved the uniqueness of various Orthodox sects yet it appears not to have been as sensitive to sub-divisions within all religious groups and left room for some frustration. 8. The following is part of a personal communication with a member of a Donme community in Istanbul. He denies of allegations of wife swapping “…Although Muslim fundamentalists will say everything that is offensive against the Donme they never say a word about ‘wife swapping bastards’. Even they believe that this is a shameless slander. I can’t help wonder why the Jews can’t think of anything else except wife swapping orgies when it comes to the Donme. Do allegations miraculously turn true when many people start believing in them? Then are we to believe in the blood libels and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion because millions of people believe that these are historical facts. How absurd. This is nonsense. It was born from sectarian hatred. The descendants of the Donme will not be ashamed of their heritage because a couple of Jewish academicians want them to be (e.g. Gershom Scholem)…”. (Name withheld for privacy). 9. Bektashi and other Shias preached equality of the sexes prior to Sababteanism, indicating either causal influence on Sabbateanism or similar processes occurring among them. 10.At the “feast of the lamb” an orgy allegedly takes place, offspring of which are considered to be holy children despite rabbinic insistence that they are bastards born of adultery. The theology of the bastard is fascinating and reflects many issues of mysticism and the breaking with traditional models of family and group hierarchy out of which the messiah is expected to emerge. This practice might also be connected to, and in some way be a response to, the problems of ‘agunot’, (Hebrew for “chained women”) whose husbands were feared dead, but Jewish law still prohibited wives from remarrying until the death had been substantiated by two eyewitnesses. In the wake of pogroms and waves of escaping refugees, eyewitnessing a death was not likely and caused difficult problems for wives. Sabbatean practice found a solution for this difficulty by legitimising a form of ritual adultery and thereby ridding themselves of a legal difficulty with the “chained women” that halakhah had no solution for. Perhaps this Sabbatean ritual, if true, developed as a response to the “agunot” crisis. 11. The Tanzimat reforms of the 1840s in Turkey were designed in part to allow Albanian Catholics freedom to worship publicly but at the same time it reduced pressures on Sabbatean Jews who professed a desire to resume public Judaism. 12. See Jacob Barnai, “The Outbreak of Sabbateanism – The Eastern European Factor”, The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy, Vol 4 pp 171-183. He argues that the 30 year war between 1618-1648 created a flood of Jewish refugees from Eastern/Central Europe to Western Europe including Germany, Austria, Hungary, France, Holland and England. He argues that in Amsterdam these refugees met Marranos “saturated by messianic tension” and were influenced by them and also by Christian doctrine. Amongst them was R’ Heschel Zoref of Vilna, who after returning to Poland, was one of the chief prophets of Sabetay Sevi. He also connects Jewish messianic groups with Christian messianic predictions around the year 1648. He quotes the work of Richard H. Popkin “Rabbi Nathan Shapira’s Visit to Amsterdam” in Dutch Jewish History, and Christian millenarians publications in London predicting the redemption and the liberation of the Jews in 1658. This connection needs further study. 13. Selahattin Ulkumen, The Turkish Consul-General of Rhodes during the Second World War was alleged to be a Donme. He interceded to save 42 Jewish families of Turkish nationality from deportation to Auschwitz. He was honoured as a “Righteous Gentile” by Yad Va-Shem in 1990. 14. On the first page of his introduction to his book “Ez Haim”, (Hakdmat MoHRH”V al Shar ha-Hakdamot) Haim Vital calculates how the Messiah should have come and has not and that all efforts to bring him have failed. He blames this failure on the false understanding of certain religious scholars. In the proceedings he argues how a mystical understanding of Jewish law is essential to the redemptive process and that a purely halakhic approach is damaging and counterproductive. His language is fierce and critical of the dry halakhists who do not understand the Kabbalah “they have brought the exit of the Divine Presence from the world”. This criticism is arguably directed at the group led by R’ Jacob Berab, which sought to re-establish the Sanhedrin and bring about the redemptive process, based on halakhic and political grounds. The causal relationship between the failure of this group and the subsequent strengthening of mystical messianism and Lurianic Kabbalah becomes increasingly evident. 15. Personal correspondence with Stephen Schwartz, a writer and researcher on religion in Kosovo. Schwartz has taken a particular interest in the relationship between Bektashism and Sabbateanism in Kosovo and the region. 16. See Donme West Website, the debate between Prof Avraham Elkayam and Stephen Schwartz on this subject is around whether Sevi was influenced by Bektashism before his conversion or only afterwards. 17. The most important Sabbatean sympathiser with Bektashiism was Mehmet Esad Dede (1841-1913) of the Izmirli Donme group. He wrote books and poems which offer insight into the Sabbatean – Bektashi relationship. 18. Many messianic sects are typically socially active within their communities and have a strong work ethic. Jewish Messianic groups such as Chabad are proactive, capable administrators and economically aggressive. This certainly strengthens the messianic unit, the motivations to join it and the sense of accomplishment that adherents derive from membership. 19. See Stanford J Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, p.136 20. Likewise, even before his apostasy to Islam, Sabetay Sevi symbolically did the same by reciting a benediction over heleb (the forbidden fat of the lamb's kidney) “Blessed art Thou, O Lord, who makes the forbidden things permissible” and caused ten Israelites to ritually eat it, a practice which allegedly remains in force among the Turkish Sabbateans this day. 21. See Avner Levi, “Shavat Aniim: Social Cleavage, Class War and Leadership in the Sephardi Community – the Case of Izmir 1847”. In Ottoman and Turkish Jewry, Eds Aron Rodrigue, (Indiana, 1992). 22. See Meir Benayahu, The Shabbatean Movement in Greece, (Hebrew), (Jerusalem, 1973). He describes the support of many for Kabbalistic writings, including Rabbi David di Medinah (p 183) who wrote praising the increased publishing of kabbalistic and hidden texts. 23. Haim Vital and other Kabbalists describe their stopovers in Salonica and infer its deep attachment to Kabbalah and esoteric studies. Many kabbalistic texts were published there including various manuscripts see for example Emek ve-Shalom, Mizrachi Sharabi, (Salonika 1796). 24. Cooperman, Eugene, 1992, Turko-Jewish Relations in the Ottoman City of Salonica (1889-1912) Ph.D dissertation (NYU, 1992). 25. Joseph Karo, for reasons unknown, was not accepted into Lurie’s study circle but was nevertheless a student of Kabbalah. Study of his personality and how he was interested both in what we call political messianism and mysticism at once, is an important key to a better understanding of these events. 26. See Jacob Katz “Vikuch al ha-Semikhah” Zion 27 27. See A.L Friedman Le-maan Zion: Two Letters on Renewing the Sanhedrin, (Hebrew) (New York, 1911) p 4. He blames those who refused to energise the ordination of rabbis and renew the Sanhedrin with the heresies that followed. He makes an analogy that plays on the two functions of “semikhah” (literally meaning to “lay hands”). In ancient Israel it was performed on two occasions, to anoint a leader or to anoint an animal for the Temple sacrifice. He argued that because the Jews refused to accept their responsibilities and anoint their leaders to redeem them, they are paying for it and have become the sacrificial animals anointed to be sacrificed for their sin. 28. See, for example, the following rabbinic quote "And the Holy One, blessed be He, will expound the meanings of a new Torah which He will give them through the Messiah." (Aleph-Bait di R. Akiba, BhM 3:27-29). "R. Hizqiya in the name of R. Simon bar Zibdi said: 'The whole Torah which you learn in This World is vanity compared to the Torah of the World to Come." (Eccl. Rab. 11:1). "The Messiah will sit in the supernal House of Study and all those who walk on earth will come and sit before him to hear a new Torah and new Commandments." (Yemenite Midrash pp. 349-50). "Zerubbabel and Elijah will come in the Messianic age and explain and expound all the secrets of Torah and all that which is crooked and distorted." (Halakhot G'dolot p. 223) 29. Reference to Holy men wearing a green sash appear in other religious writings see, for example, Aaron Zvi Eshkoli, Rabbi Haim Vital; Sefer Hizionot, (Hebrew) (Jerusalem,1954). Vital recounts various visions where semi messianic or holy characters are wearing the green sash. Perhaps these portrayals are indicative of a more profound association. 30. Although Sabetay Sevi was obviously not a warrior there were many rumours that spread in his life time that he had been enlisted by the Sultan to lead troops to conquer Poland and Germany. See Barnai p.181 quoting R’ Jacob Sasportas “And now the liars have become aroused to write more stories, that the Sultan made him his commander in chief and sent him with 200,000 men to war in Poland to fulfill the prophecy of the Devil (Nathan) the Ashkenazi of Gaza, who said he would avenge those who were killed in Poland”. 31. See Esther Benbassa, “Zionism and the Politics of Coalitions”, in Ottoman and Turkish Jewry, eds Aron Rodrigue, (Indiana, 1992) 32. See article in “7 days” (Hebrew weekly) of the 20-5-99. 33. This subject is addressed in my article entitled “Arab Christianity and Zionism” (forthcoming). 34. The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, eds Avigdor Levi, Washington, 1994, Jewish representation in the Ottoman parliaments by Hasan Kayal pp 507-517 35. See Walter F. Weiker, Ottomans, Turks and the Jewish Polity, (Jerusalem , 1992) p 250 describes the “Varlk Vergisi” tax levy that all non-Muslims and foreigners were charged. The Donme had their own tax schedule in distinction from Muslims and although it was not as high it reflected an official distinction. 36. See Baer, Marc David, “Revealing a Hidden Community: Ilgaz Zorlu and the Debate in Turkey over the Donme/Sabbateans” The Turkish Studies Association, Vol 23, Spring 1999 1, pp 68-75 discuses the Zorlu controversy. 37. See Eli Kedourie, Young Turcs, Freemasons and Jews (1977) pp 243-63. 38. See Eugene Cooperman, “The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Jewish Community of Salonica” in Studies on Turkish-Jewish History, eds. David Altabe,Erhan Atay, Israel Katz, (New York, 1996). Ahmad and Lewis disagree arguing that Jews were not in the upper echelons of the C.U.P. 39. See Kedourie 40. Although this is likely confused with his attendance at a school governed by Donme and his first teacher Semsi Efendi was an active Donme, who tried to unite the three strands of the sect. Although Ataturk’s father was a Turkish speaking Albanian and his mother a Pomak – Slavic Macedonian Muslim he was sent to study with the Donmeh. Ataturk himself describes in an important speech “Nutuk” that he was sent to study under Semsi Efendi – in the most progressive school of the day. 41. Cooperman p 176. 42. Cooperman 43. The Russian author Vladmir Gordevsky writes as early as 1926 p. 200 how the Donme were becoming politically active in Salonica. As this occurred after the revolution they clearly felt that they were vidicated and had rights that need not be left secret. 44. Slousch 1908: 495 45. He was since found guiltless. 46. Aryeh Shmuelevitz, Ottoman History and Society – Jewish Sources, (Istanbul, 1999), pp 73-87. 47. Two Hebrew weeklies supported both Zionism and the Young Turks the first was “Hamevasser” 1910-1911 published in Istanbul and “Haverenu” published in Izmir in 1922. 48. Pukru Haniolu, “Jews in the Young Turk Movement to the 1908 Revolution”, in The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, Eds Avigdor Levi Washington, 1994. 519-526 49. See “Vilayetlerimiz” in Mechveret, no 15, 23 July, 1896, p 3. 50. See Hak-Gu, “Selanik’den Mektub,” in Mechveret, no 15, 23 July, 1896 p 4 as quoted in Pukru Haniolu, p.522). 51. See Pukru Haniolu, 522 52. See Hasan Kayal, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire, eds Avigdor Levi (Washington, 1994) 507-517 53. Ex-Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos gave an interview to the Greek Eleftherotypia Newspaper (17 December 2000) declaring Ismail Cem not to be a pure Turk but a Salonici Donme. He said that the foreign ministry of Turkey was in the hands of those whose races were different. Most of the Foreign Ministers of the Turkish Republic have in fact been of Donme origin. 54. Channel 7 on the 22nd of September 2000 55. See George E. Gruen, “Turkey’s Relations with Israel: From Ambivalence to Open Cooperation”, 112-129 in Studies on Turkish-Jewish History. home